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Cheek Is Chic. Ignorance of the Law Is an Excuse
for Tax Crimes-A Fashion That Does Not Wear
Well
Mark D. Yochum*
In these pages, brief years ago, I undertook a general review and
modest criticism of a corner of the federal criminal tax law. The
title,' in a sense, told all. Ignorance of the law provides no defense
in ordinary criminal prosecutions. For most significant federal tax
crimes, however, knowledge of the illegality of the conduct is an
element of the offense. The word willfully in these statutes had
been interpreted consistently by the Supreme Court (albeit
unartfully) as the "violation of a known legal duty."2 Conse-
quently, tax evaders with the most outrageous delusions concern-
ing the state of their obligations such as "wages are not income"
are permitted to offer this not-quite-madness in their defense.
In spite of the Supreme Court's consistent interpretation of the
word and, the numerous applications of this rule of subjective
knowledge of illegality by several circuits, the Seventh Circuit, for
a decade, had offered an aberrant view.3 In that circuit, the courts
had instructed juries that only those beliefs of the defendant which
were objectively reasonable might be considered as a defense to the
* B.A., 1974 Carnegie Mellon University; J.D., 1977 Georgetown University Law
Center; Associate Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law.
1. Mark D. Yochum, Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse for Tax Crimes, 27 Du-
quesne L Rev 221 (1989)(Yochum, "Ignorance").
2. United States v Pomponio, 429 US 10, 12 (1976) (Per Curiam). Pomponio is at
the end, pre-Cheek, of a thirty year examination of this problem beginning with United
States v Murdock, 290 US 389 (1933) and Spies v United States, 317 US 492 (1943).




willfulness requirement. The Supreme Court struck down this lone
circuit's view in Cheek v United States.
The purpose of this brief revisit to the principles which attend
allowing ignorance of the law as an excuse is to illustrate a dismay-
ing trend toward fresh confusion. Although Cheek simply reiter-
ates prior law and adds nothing new (except in a discreet, quaint
twist on the Constitution), the decision has become popular.' This
popularity, where all Cheek is chic, has led to a revival of consider-
ation of longstanding procedures and instructions in tax prosecu-
tions which had developed as corollary rules to the proposition
that proof of the actor's knowledge of illegality is an element of the
crime.
John Cheek is no madman. He does not rave, live in the deep
woods, or carry a shotgun to pepper revenuers. He is a soft-spoken
pilot for a major airline. Cheek did not pay tax, implementing
standard arguments and techniques of the tax protest movement.
He filed W-4 forms which claimed up to 60 allowances. He fought
civil tax assessments and lost. He argued that wages were not in-
come and that the Sixteenth Amendment does not authorize the
income tax. He lost civil cases. He persisted and was prosecuted
for willful evasion.'
Cheek was told by lawyers, the Service, and the courts in his
own civil cases that his views were wrong. The Service's insistent
perennial forms and instructions called plainly for a tax on his
wages. He knew that the overwhelming mass of his fellow citizens
thought he was wrong; he knew we voluntarily complied. One
might pause and consider whether such a Cheek-like mental state
itself is worthy of the imposition of some criminal liability. Holmes
suggested that ignorance of the law is not an excuse for crimes be-
cause the law-giver has decided that men must "know and obey.'' 7
This decision is justified because "justice to the individual is
rightly outweighed" by societal consideration.8 No one can chal-
lenge the fairness of the imposition of some penalty for such "igno-
4. US , 111 SCt 604 (1991) ("Cheek").
5. J. Andrew Hoerner, 'Cheeky' Defenses in Vogue, Says Bruton, 54 Tax Notes 934
(February 24, 1992)(Cheek creating large volume of cases for Justice Department); Tax
Notes 1061 (December 2, 1991)(Justice Department finding Cheek is being applied too
broadly).
6. IRC § 7201 (1986) provides that he "who willfully attempts in any manner to
evade or defeat any tax" is guilty of a felony. (Citations to the Internal Revenue Code shall
be IRC §).
7. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 48 (1881).
8. Holmes, The Common Law 48:
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rance;" however, as tax crimes require proof of knowledge of the
law, this kind of stupidity results in acquittal.
Cheek told the jury that he thought he owed nothing because he
had attended seminars for twelve years held by the anti-tax move-
ment. He said some of these speakers were lawyers. He studied on
his own and he really, sincerely, in "good faith," believed that
wages were not income and that the income tax was
unconstitutional.
The jury sent several notes to the judge during its deliberations.
The jury wrote that a verdict could not be reached because the
group was split as to whether Cheek "honestly & [sic] reasonably
believed that he was not required to pay income taxes."9 The
judge's response was direct and incorrect. In the Seventh Circuit's
style, he instructed that an unreasonable belief is not a defense for
it does not negate the willfulness requirement. The beliefs that
wages are not income and 'that the tax laws are unconstitutional
are unreasonable. A persistent unreasonable refusal to acknowl-
edge the law is not a misunderstanding which vitiates the proof of
the willfulness.
After this additional guidance, the jury rapidly found Cheek
completely guilty. A few of the jurors complained to the trial judge
that the law was "narrow and hard."1 ° Another note from this sen-
sitive jury painted an heroic picture of the winsome Cheek: "I
know the gentleman is guilty of a crime. However, I honestly be-
lieve he believed so deeply in his cause that he has risked every-
thing . . . and truly does not believe he is breaking the law.""1
The Seventh Circuit affirmed Cheek's convictions based upon
these instructions, relying on long-standing precedent in the Cir-
cuit which had required objective reasonableness in beliefs held by
defendants to negate willfulness.12 The Circuit's opinion in Cheek
on his direct appeal does not expound further on the rationale for
9. 111 S Ct at 608 (cited in note 4).
10. United States v Cheek, 882 F2d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir 1989) ("Cheek I").
11. Cheek I, 882 F2d at 1267 (cited in note 10)(Emphasis in the original). This view
of heroic civil disobedience resulting in acquittal is at odds with the proper consequence of
an illegal act to protest against a law, jail or fine. The speech aspects of the disobedience,
the affirmance and publication of belief in the law's wrong, are effectuated by public trial
and punishment. See United States v Kellogg, 955 F2d 1244 (9th Cir 1992). Kellogg aided
in the preparation of false returns, a violation of IRC § 7206(2), "'to show America . . .
what's wrong with this tax system.'" Kellogg, 955 F2d at 1246. Jail resulted for Kellogg as
motive or sincerity of a protest is irrelevant as long as knowledge of illegality is proven. Id at
1247.
12. See United States v Buckner, 830 F2d 102 (7th Cir 1987); United States v
Moore, 627 F2d 830 (7th Cir 1980).
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its deviance. That rationale was the product of some tortured rea-
soning concerning the general rule of the unavailability of mistake
of law defenses. The Seventh Circuit had for a decade simply not
recognized that subjective, actual knowledge of the law was an ele-
ment of tax crimes such as Cheek's.
The history of the Supreme Court in interpreting the word will-
fully in tax crimes is not an artful tapestry woven with foresight.
As Justice White notes in delivering the opinion in Cheek, the
Court's original interpretation of the word, in the 1930's, was born
of its belief that due to the complexity of the revenue laws, Con-
gress must have intended that willfully meant more than a pur-
poseful act but also implied knowledge of illegality. Of course, not
a scintilla of legislative history is extant as proof of that concern.
Congress, presumably knowing the Court's view, however, has
failed to modify these criminal statutes while altering or adding to
them on other topics.13 Confusion persisted through the mid-sev-
enties as to whether there was even an additional and separate ele-
ment of the offenses besides knowledge of illegality, namely, an
evil intent. This confusion was produced, by the Court itself.", Fi-
nally, after several trips to the highest level, the word was given a
settled reading to all but the Seventh Circuit; willfully is the "in-
tentional violation of a known legal duty." 5
The natural consequence of this interpretation of the statute is
that an irrational belief sincerely held put before a sympathetic
jury results in acquittal. This author had expressed a wistful hope
that the Court in Cheek would recognize that no longer is the tax
statute an arcane regulatory device but rather that it is well-under-
stood in its fundamental obligations. Consequently, willfully
should simply refer to the act itself, purposefully not paying tax. If
prosecutions involved complex rules or dicey facts, the ordinary
principles with respect to vagueness should provide enough protec-
tion for defendants to satisfy justice. Short of throwing out knowl-
edge of illegality as an element of these crimes, statutory modifica-
tions could reduce the confusion, the waste of time, and the
opportunity for disrespect to our system. A statute might limit, as
the Seventh Circuit tried by judicial fiat, claims of ignorance to
13. The argument that Congress adopts judicial construction of statutes silently
when reenacting them is weak. See discussion of James at notes 69-90 and accompanying
text.
14. See United States v Bishop, 412 US 346, 360 (1973)(Suggesting that willfully
means evil motive).
15. Pomponio, 429 US at 12 (cited in note 2).
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reasonable confusions. A codified reliance on competent counsel
defense may also serve as an appropriate compromise. Hope for a
judicial resolution was admittedly idle; the ethic of stare decisis
would lead the Court to defer to the Congress for any change and
to reverse the Seventh Circuit in Cheek.
In Cheek, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the notion that even
irrational beliefs held in good faith with respect to the obligations
of the Internal Revenue Code vitiated the willfulness requirement
of tax crimes. The "willfully" statutes require for conviction proof
of the defendant's actual knowledge of illegality. Testing the rea-
sonableness of an erroneous belief which a taxpayer holds which,
in turn, precludes him from knowing the law as it is improperly
relieves the government of its burden to prove all the elements of a
crime.
The Court erroneously suggests that to preclude the jury from
considering irrational beliefs would raise Sixth Amendment consid-
erations. For this notion, the opinion cites cases such as Sand-
strom v Montana.'6 Sandstrom stands for the proposition that an
element of the crime cannot be proven by presumption. The Court
couples this idea with the principle that statutes should be inter-
preted to avoid raising constitutional questions. Of course, the only
reason this constitutional tension arises is because the Court had
concluded that knowledge of the law is an element of the crime.
There is no suggestion in Cheek or anywhere that tax crimes (or
any crime) must have, to pass constitutional muster, knowledge of
the law as an element of the offense. The traditional limitation on
the scope of crimes is embodied in the notion of vagueness or due
process. After all, ignorance of the law is no excuse.
With respect to Cheek's constitutional delusions, that the Code
is invalid, the Court splits a previously unseen hair. The Court
opines that the history of the knowledge requirement in tax felo-
nies was born of the fear of prosecution resulting from the com-
plexity of the Code. Constitutional objections to the tax, conse-
quently, are of a "different order," and belief of constitutionality is
not an element of the crime.'7 Rational or irrational beliefs about
the unconstitutionality of the federal tax are newly and happily
irrelevant under Cheek. The Seventh Circuit had held that such
beliefs were unreasonable and were properly excluded from consid-
eration, but not because belief of constitutionality was not an ele-
16. 442 US 510 (1979).
17. Cheek, 111 S Ct at 612 (cited in note 4).
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ment of the crime. As Justice Scalia notes in his concurrence, puz-
zling over this distinction:
I find it impossible to understand how one can derive from the lonesome
word 'willfully' the proposition that belief in the nonexistence of a textual
prohibition excuses liability, but belief in the invalidity ... does not.18
The consequence is that Cheek may be retried. His delusion about
the Constitution will go unmentioned. If the jury believes that he
believes (as the first jury certainly did) that wages are not income,
he will be set free.19
As the dissenters Justices Blackmun and Marshall note, the
Court's primary premise, that anyone sane could claim confusion
about such fundamental tax propositions of long standing, is
false.20 They suggest that Cheek is even lucky to have the jury con-
sider whether reasonable delusions vitiate the criminal intent. In a
sense, the dissenters are a step shy of saying that the time has
come to overrule this singular construction of tax crimes which
flouts the maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse.
The decision in Cheek does have the virtue of being a consistent
application (in part) of prior Supreme Court decisions. Sadly, no
reconsideration of the basis of the rule, the supposed complexity of
tax obligations, was accomplished. Rethinking, that proposition
may have led to a different result. The decision which removes the
"unconstitutionality" argument from the set of tax protesters' de-
fenses may be tortured but is at least helpful and direct. At the
first glance toward Cheek, the Treasury viewed the decision as a
helpful victory for the home team.2 The criminal element in this
field is, however, maddeningly perverse and still well-armed.
The real harm of the Cheek decision is its effect, albeit difficult
to gauge, on the wavering ethics of the citizenry and the shaky
sense of justice in our world of somewhat voluntary self-assess-
ment. Decisions which proclaim knowledge of the law as a prereq-
uisite to incarceration must suggest to the possible tax risk-taker
that ignorance is a little more valuable than seeking competent tax
advice. This real problem, manifested by the virulent tax protest
movement, is the reason the initial interpretation of the tax crimes
18. Id at 614.
19. Whether others similarly convicted prior to Cheek may get new trials is a matter
of the procedural posture of their case. See e.g. United States v Dunkel 927 F2d 955 (7th
Cir 1991)(United States had waived its claim that the defendant had waived a Cheek claim;
Cheek error is plain error).
20. Cheek, 111 S Ct at 615 (cited in note 4).
21. Marianne Evans, This Week's Tax News, Tax Notes 567 (February 11, 1991).
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was and continues to be so shortsighted. Taxpayers should be en-
couraged to discover the law. But the day after Cheek was issued,
the picture of a sober and sadfaced Cheek topped the front page of
USA Today and the headline teased: 'Sincere' Tax Evaders May
Skip Jail."
The Seventh Circuit considered on remand whether Cheek
should be retried,23 properly concluding that because Cheek raised
both constitutional and statutory misunderstandings, a retrial was
in order. The Seventh Circuit issued a stern warning, however, that
"evaders who persist in their frivolous beliefs . . . should not be
encouraged by . . . Cheek."" In spite of this almost private chas-
tisement, Cheek has fired the twisted imaginations of those who
would seek to expand the perverse notion that ignorance of the law
is an excuse. Further, Cheek-based arguments have been met with
sympathy and acceptance even when the decision itself is plainly
distinguishable or inapposite. Cheek has created a fashion, a rage.
To display this fashion, this author has selected a series of snap-
shots of Cheek in vogue. This array is particularly time bound, as
fashion always is. As these words are read, new decisions with a
patch of Cheek are being issued, decisions which will color or rend
the illustrations presented here. But the pattern of the problems
presented by Cheek will continue. This brief album with its not-so-
pretty pictures is produced to persuade those who might be
tempted to dress an argument in Cheek that the look is singularly
unattractive.
First, as evidence of the confusion generated by a misplaced en-
thusiasm for Cheek, witness United States v Moran."5 Moran, an
Omaha policeman and owner of a video rental store, was charged
under 17 USC section 506(a) 6 as a "person who infringes a copy-
right willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage ... "2
Moran purchased commercial videos, copied them, and rented the
copies. He argued that he was not pirating but rather insuring his
purchased tapes from vandalism. The issue was whether the word
willfully in this statute means knowledge of illegality as Cheek
22. Tony Mauro, 'Sincere' Tax Evaders May Skip Jail, USA Today 1A (January 9,
1991).
23. United States v. Cheek, 931 F2d 1206 (7th Cir 1991) ("Cheek II").
24. Cheek 11, 931 F2d at 1208-09 (cited in note 23).
25. 757 F Supp 1046 (D Neb 1991).
26. Copyrights, 17 USC § 506(a) (1988).
27. Moran, 757 F Supp at 1048 (citation omitted).
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confirmed is the case in tax. crimes. 28 The Government argued that
in the copyright statute, willfully simply means intended to copy.2 9
Writing virtually without precedent in the law of copyright
crimes but with Cheek chic, the District Court held that when
"used in complex statutory schemes, such as federal criminal tax
statutes," the term willfully requires proof of knowledge of illegal-
ity.30 Further, the court swallowed all of Cheek, holding that the
test of knowledge is a subjective one; that is, unreasonable beliefs,
if actually held, will preclude conviction. 1 The court believed Mo-
ran did not know he was sinning and entered a judgment for
acquittal.
32
Moran exemplifies the problems associated with applying the
Cheek interpretation of the mental state in "willful" crimes gener-
ally. The District Court, echoing Cheek, perpetuates the myth that
the particular law which generates the social obligation (albeit tax
or copyright) is so complex that the criminal law must be inter-
preted to provide protection for citizens who might be unwarily
trapped. Nothing in Cheek should be read as establishing a new
rule for all federal crimes. This fear of prosecution for crimes
which are theoretically unknowable must be so visceral in both
judges and citizens that the Cheek pattern of analysis is repeated
for its soothing qualities. The tax thieves, like Cheek himself, how-
ever, take from all of us by not performing their well-understood
responsibilities, failing to pay tax on wages, or not reporting ille-
gally gotten gains. Prosecutions based on arcane interpretations
should be adequately protected by ordinary principles of vague-
ness, an issue not reached in Moran.
Under color of Cheek, in United States v Aversa,33 the District
Court, in an anguish-filled opinion, reviews the appropriate mental
state for conviction under 31 USC section 5322(a)"' for "willfully"
structuring a cash transaction. Aversa, experiencing marital diffi-
culties, structured cash transactions with a co-defendant to avoid
the cash reporting requirements.3 The "structuring" was keeping a
series of transactions in cash between Aversa and his partner
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id at 1049.
31. Id at 1051.
32. Id at 1053.
33. 762 F Supp 441 (D NH 1991).
34. Money and Finance, Pub L No 97-258, 96 Stat 877 (1982), codified at 31 USC §
5322(a) (1988).
35. Aversa, 762 F Supp at 441-42.
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under ten thousand dollars per transfer.3 6 There was no element of
t.x evasion; the intent was to hide the money from his wife." The
District Court, however, instructed the jury based upon United
States v Scanio. s
In Scanio, the Second Circuit had held that, with respect to
structuring transactions, proof of knowledge of illegality is not re-
quired. The Second Circuit's rationale was that in ordinary crimi-
nal statutes, willfully does not imply such proof.3 9 Furthermore,
the legislative history suggests Congress intended that a conviction
only required proof the defendant was aware of the reporting pro-
visions (as Aversa was), not that he was aware his proposed trans-
action was illegal.4 Obliquely dealing with a charge of vagueness,
the Second Circuit in Scanio noted that the defendant "engaged in
affirmative conduct and demonstrated an awareness of the legal
framework relative to currency transactions which ... should have
alerted him to the consequences of his conduct."'" Would that
such were the rule for tax crimes.
Aversa moved to set aside his conviction based upon newly-de-
cided Cheek, a conviction under the Scanio instruction which the
District Court characterized as "shooting fish in a barrel."4 Re-
thinking, the District Court concluded that Cheek required a
knowledge-of-illegality element in tax or tax related crimes which
use the term willfully.4 Consequently, Scanio was wrongly de-
cided, at least in New Hampshire.44 Jurisdictional impediments in
the case restricted the ability of the court to grant a new trial to
Aversa. The opinion promises that the court will do all it can to
remedy what it characterizes as a "miscarriage of justice." '45 After
all, the court notes, "[u]nderstanding one's duties under the struc-
turing statute is certainly more difficult- and less common than un-
derstanding ones' legal duty to file a tax return.
'46
36. Id at 442.
37. Id at 442-43.
38. Id at 444-47 citing United States v Scanio, 900 F2d 485 (2d Cir 1990).
39. Scanio, 900 F2d at 489.
40. Id at 491.
41. Id at 490.
42. Aversa, 762 F Supp at 444.
43. Id at 447.
44. But see United States v Dashney, 937 F2d 532 (10th Cir 1991), cert denied in 112
S Ct 402 (1991). Cheek does not require proof of knowledge of illegality in cash structuring
transactions. "Cheek involves only certain criminal tax statutes, and we see no reason to
extend [it] into straightforward currency reporting requirements." Dashney, 937 F2d at 540.




In recommending the elimination of the "ignorance-of-the-law"
defense or its modification by a statutory "reliance-on-counsel" de-
fense, or in simply arguing that Cheek should be limited to its
facts, this author is not arguing for increased prison terms for more
individuals. The purpose of this piece is to illustrate that Cheek
effectuated no change in prior law and should not be treated as
enunciating a new principle or philosophy which might have appli-
cation beyond the bounds of that case. Cheek should be treated as
having no impact beyond tax crimes which contain the expression,
willfully. Confusion engendered by Cheek chic is simply a waste of
time.
Those who fear eased possibilities of incarceration if the Cheek
rule were modified may contest the revenue and social value of
marginally increased deterrence. Who can measure the impact of
the publicity about prison terms on compliance and collection?
More concrete is the concern that tax often presents issues which
are truly dicey and that running afoul of such provisions should
not land you in jail. The Cheek rule is further justified if ordinary
vagueness principles are inadequate to protect innocent but un-
wary citizens against a rapacious state. Our concern, however,
should not be about all legal or colorably legal principles which are
claimed to be uncertain but are not (wages are not income).
Rather, our concern should be with the way in which protection is
afforded a defendant who is prosecuted for a violation which is in
some sense less certain, not only to the particular defendant, but
to everyone.
Two sorts of cases present the possibility of prosecution for de-
batable (but not frivolously so) tax matters. These may be styled
"the gift problem" and "the tricky section problem." The gift
problem deals with tax cases that are determined by simple legal
principles, but for which, because the outcome is fact-based on
multiple factors, the ultimate result may be difficult to predict.
Gifts are excludable under section 102,17 but the great Commis-
sioner v Duberstein48 relies on life to supply the answer as to
whether the dominant motive of the transferor was a detached
generosity, springing from affection or charity.49 The law is well
known; however, facts may make determination complex. The
tricky section problem, on the other hand, is presented by the tax-
47. IRC § 102 (1986).
48. 363 US 278 (1960).
49. Duberstein, 363 US at 285.
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payer who engages in a transaction in which the salient facts are
without dispute but the law is purportedly uncertain. The issue is
whether either of these sorts of cases presents a rationale for the
preservation or advancement of Cheek chic, where ignorance is
exculpatory.
The well publicized post-Cheek case of United States v Harris5
presents the gift problem at its lurid best. In Harris, twin sisters,
Harris and Conley, lived with (in its full colloquial meaning) the
wealthy Mr. Kritzen. Their favors were appreciated and, before he
died, Kritzen transferred more than a half a million dollars to
each. He paid no gift tax; they paid no income tax. The sisters
each were convicted of willful evasion and failure to file.
In this post-Cheek opinion, the Seventh Circuit's reversal of the
convictions unnecessarily blurs several issues. (This running of
ideas together, like bleeding madras, is part of Cheek fashion.) At
once, the court holds that the evidence was insufficient to show
that the sisters had income, a necessary predicate tothe charges,
and that the evidence was insufficient to show they acted with
Cheek, with a knowing disregard of legal obligations." It is in the
former conclusion that the major protection for defendants is re-
vealed in those factually complex but legally simple cases. The
prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the item
was not a gift. Knowledge of the illegality of failure to report in-
come that is not a gift, is not reached. Consequently, those worried
about aggressive prosecution in cases such as the gift problem
should be comforted by knowing that a dicey factual predicate pre-
cludes prosecution because a tax obligation itself or a requirement
to file cannot be proven.
Of course, the author's sympathy in this area is still with the
prosecutor, as several opportunities are available for the doubtful
taxpayer to avoid evasion charges without leaning on the ignorance
of the law excuse. Seeking truly expert advice, ruling requests, dis-
closing an item On the return and noting the proposed treatment,
or paying tax and seeking a refund are ways (admittedly not pain
or cost free) to educate the citizen without criminal surprise.2 The
gift problem is not a vagueness problem. The receipt of anything of
50. 942 F2d 1125 (7th Cir 1991).
51. Harris, 942 F2d at 1128.
52. The Service will not issue determinations on everything. Fact-based problems
may permit the Service to refuse a request. Rev Proc 92-1 at 17. Generally, the limitation on
ruling requests involves particular rules such as to whether compensation is reasonable,
rather than a blanket prohibition of fact-based items. Rev Proc 92-3.
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value by a citizen should be presumed by the citizen to create a tax
issue even if it is later resolved by the exclusion of the income.
Further, the alternative defensive position (it was an excludable
item) presents the sort of studied approach to evasion that the
Court, in part, found so abhorrent in restricting the use of consti-
tutional delusions as a defense in Cheek.
Of course, in the flush of Cheek chic, the Seventh Circuit could
not rest on lack of proof by the Government that there was no gift.
Instead, it held "that current law on the tax treatment of pay-
ments to mistresses provided . . . no fair warning that [the] con-
duct was criminal."5 3 The Seventh Circuit does not ground acquit-
tal on grounds of vagueness but rather takes a middle Cheek
position that "[ijf the obligation to pay a tax is sufficiently in
doubt, willfulness is impossible as a matter of law. ... ",' The opin-
ion reviews a short rasher of cases with disparate treatment on
payments to mistresses which, the Seventh Circuit concludes,
"turn entirely on their facts"5 5 and provide no warning. Of course,
the court fails to recognize that the simple existence of such cases
presents a measure of warning that the government might feel
such payments might be taxable. The Seventh Circuit is firm how-
ever, in that "[n]ew points of tax law may not be the basis of crim-
inal convictions."56
The conclusion intimated by Harris is that "fact"-based imposi-
tions cannot serve as the basis for prosecution, absent direct prece-
dent on the fact pattern. One might note that such issues dot tax
law, and law generally. The oft-quoted aphorism about life supply-
ing us the answer to our tax riddles comes from far before Cheek,
well before Dubenstein, in Justice Cardozo's brief and pithy Welch
v Helvering" a case examining the (now) section 16211 deduction.
Would the Seventh Circuit suggest that, as business deductions are
tested in a fact-based way, untoward taxpayer enthusiasm for the
53. Harris, 942 F2d at 1131.
54. Id at 1132. The-Seventh Circuit implies that a law might present two levels of
ambiguity. "Objective ambiguity," the failure to provide fair notice, requires the court to
review the law and, if ambiguity is found, dismiss the indictment. "Subjective ambiguity" is
simple wrongheadedness by the defendant (which is endemic in the protest movement); this
sort of ambiguity is the one which should be argued to the jury as part of the defendant's
case that he in good faith held the contrary view, vitiating the Cheek requirement that he
knew the law. Id at n 6.
55. Id at 1134.
56. Id at 1131.
57. 290 US 111 (1933).
58. IRC § 162 (1986).
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deduction cannot serve as the basis for prosecution?
Before Cheek, the gift problem was similarly resolved. In United
States v Garber,5" the Fifth Circuit reversed the evasion conviction
of Ms. Garber who failed to pay tax on the sale of her own rare
blood to a pharmaceutical company. Although she had ample
warning that the payments might be income from experts and the
company that paid her, she followed her own experts and chose to
treat the receipts as non-taxable.0 0 The majority held that restrict-
ing the admission of evidence concerning the law's uncertainty was
reversible error."' Anticipating Cheek, the court held that evidence
about doubtful construction of the statute is admissible because it
tends to reduce a taxpayer's ability to know the law.6 2 The Fifth
Circuit noted:
To hold otherwise would advocate convicting an unsophisticated taxpayer
who failed to seek expert advice . . . while setting free a wise taxpayer who
could find advice that taxes were not due.
63
While there is a populist appeal in the Garber court's characteri-.
zation of the problem, such a dichotomy is false. The unsophistica-
ted taxpayer who has a receipt would be hard pressed to conclude
any receipt is not income. After all, his life is testimony that all
gotten gain is taxed. There can be no real argument that the law is
so vague that the taxpayer did not even know there was a problem.
In any case, even under Cheek, the so-called ambiguity in the law
should merely be evidence of the ability to form the criminal in-
tent, not grounds for dismissing indictments, unless the ambiguity
truly rises to vagueness.
For example, in the off-cited United States v Critzer,"6 the
Fourth Circuit reversed the willful evasion conviction of an East-
ern Cherokee Indian. Critzer failed to report income from her vari-
ous businesses which were located on the reservation. Again, the
opinion notes that even the government conceded that the taxabil-
ity of the items arising on the reservation was legally undecided. 6
The Department of the Interior advised Ms. Critzer that the items
were exempt. The court held that if the law is "vague or highly
debatable," a defendant necessarily lacks the requisite intent,
59. 607 F2d 92 (5th Cir 1979) en banc, four judges dissenting.
60. Garber, 607 F2d at 100.
61. Id at 97.
62. Id at 98.
63. Id.
64. 498 F2d 1160 (4th Cir 1974).
65. Critzer, 498 F2d at 1161.
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namely, to violate a known legal duty.66
The behavior of Ms. Critzer was less culpable than that of Ms.
Garber. Critzer sought advice with more than colorable compe-
tence and followed it. Garber was given advice that her blood pro-
duced income and disregarded it. Neither consulted the IRS. 7 The
issue is, however, whether the elimination of the knowledge of law
element of the felony would result in unjust prosecutions and con-
viction. Ms. Critzer could have gone through the usual civil alter-
natives of payment and suit for refund. The Fourth Circuit held
that "the appropriate vehicle to decide this pioneering interpreta-
tion of tax liability is the civil procedure .... "68 Thus, rather than
confronting the issue of law whether the items were taxable, the
court punted.
There has been a dearth of cases holding that any particular tax
obligation is vague. The Supreme Court itself, in James v United
States,69 has provided the classic case of confusion over what to do
in the close case. James illustrates the second sort of problem case,
the tricky statute or more properly, the tricky opinion. In James,
the facts were agreed upon, but the tax law applied was subject to
disagreement at the highest levels. (Perhaps the greatest testimony
to the theoretical complexity of tax issues is how often the Su-
preme Court clouds rather than clears.) The Court had deter-
mined, in Commissioner v Wilcox, 7 0 that the proceeds of embezzle-
ment were not income largely because the criminal has a
contemporaneous obligation to repay. Six years later, in Rutkin v
United States, 1 the proceeds of extortion were held taxable, but
Wilcox was not explicitly overruled. Finally, Mr. James, an embez-
zler, was convicted of evasion, in spite of Wilcox.7 2 In James the
Supreme Court reexamined Wilcox and concluded that embezzled
funds were income. 73 The issue then became what to do with the
convicted felon James.
74
Justice Warren was joined by Justices Brennan and Stewart for
66. Id.
67. Evidence in Critzer was refused at argument on appeal that the IRS itself had
been telling other Eastern Cherokee Indians to file for refunds for taxes paid on identical
items. Id at 1161.
68. Id at 1164 (emphasis added).
69. 366 US 213 (1961)(James).
70. 327 US 404 (1946).
71. 343 US 130 (1952).
72. US v James, 273 F2d 5 (7th Cir 1959)((James I).
73. James, 366 US at 221.
74. Id at 221-22.
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a plurality opinion on the disposition of James' conviction." War-
ren argued that the old precedent, Wilcox, had been "thoroughly
devitalized" by the subsequent decision in Rutkin as there is no
difference in the obligation to repay of an embezzler or extortion-
ist. 6 Many circuits had found the most subtle of distinctions from
Wilcox to allow embezzlers' convictions on tax evasion charges in
spite of the old case." James' argument (that reenactment of the
code post-Wilcox implied congressional approval of its rule) was
dismissed by Warren who, in turn, cleverly suggested that Con-
gress itself may have thought the case had been impliedly over-
ruled.78 Nonetheless, Warren held, not that the statute or law was
vague, but rather that as a matter of law willfulness could not be
proven because of this level of confusion.79 This opinion proposed
reversal of the conviction and dismissal of the indictment.80 The
test for conviction was Cheek, as it always had been, violation of a
known legal duty.
Black and Douglas dissented (an intact record of taxpayer ori-
ented decision-making).8 1 Participants in Wilcox, they agreed with
its analysis, and thought it was being shabbily overruled.2 Justice
Black, in an instructive opinion, suggests that if Wilcox were
wrong, then it was always wrong and James should be convicted.
8 3
These two tax dinosaurs agreed with the plurality only on the dis-
missal of James' case.8 Justice Whittaker latched onto this view. 5
Justice Clark, writing separately, thought Wilcox was not only
wrong but had been overruled "sub silentio" by the pervasive
Glenshaw Glass."6 Clark suggested the conviction should be af-
firmed because the proof showed James had "placed no bona fide
75. Id.
76. Id at 215. "Questions of federal income taxation are not determined by such 'at-
tenuated subtleties.'" Id at 216 quoting Lucas v Earl, 281 US 111, 114 (1929).
77. See, for example Kann v Commissioner, 210 F2d 247 (3d Cir 1953); United
States v Wyss, 239 F2d 658 (7th Cir 1957); and Briggs v United States, 214 F2d 699 (4th
Cir 1954).
78. James, 366 US at 220.
79. Id at 221-22.
80. Id at 222.
81. Id.
82. Id at 223-25.
83. Id at 222. "In our judgment one of the great inherent restraints upon this Court's
departure from the field of interpretation to enter that of lawmaking has been the fact that
its judgments could not be limited to prospective application." Id.
84. Id.
85. Id at 248-50.
86. Id at 241.
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reliance on Wilcox. 's7 This response is aggressively tres Cheek.
Prosecutors can still show that the defendant is lying when he says
he believes the law is other than what it is. Trial courts today can
determine that claims of ambiguity ought to be put to the jury to
test the defendant's good faith belief in those claims.
Justice Harlan and Frankfurter thought Wilcox was wrong but
that James should be retried."8 Unlike the plurality but like Justice
Clark, they agreed that the mere existence of the legal uncertainty
did not preclude conviction. 9 James should be retried with a jury
charged that "his good faith and actual belief" in the wrongly de-
cided Wilcox required acquittal.90 This conclusion is straight
Cheek.
As in Critzer,9 1 James never reaches (or needs to reach) the
question of vagueness. The problem of doubtful legal interpreta-
tion is at the center of Cheek, and the response of the courts might
be (as in James) that the debate is evidence of intent or precludes
forming the intent. The debate, however, is admissible and mate-
rial, whether reasonable or not. One would hope that courts will
not encourage the tax felon in even a minute way by supporting
dismissals as a matter of law. Nothing in Cheek requires that con-
clusion.92 Constitutional vagueness principles have not come into
play largely because courts need not reach the issue if they believe
the law is confused enough to preclude formation of the mental
state.
Unsettled legal issues involving sophisticated schemes, more
tricky statute problems, have produced results which are Cheek!
James-like dispositions. In United States v Schmidt,9 the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the taxpayer's conviction on a number of the
"willful" tax felonies. Schmidt sold a trust scam, called Unincorpo-
rated Business Organizations, a -trail of shady paper which, he
claimed, resulted in the deductibility of personal items (like food).
87. Id. See United States v Sturman, 951 F2d 1466 (6th Cir 1991). In Sturman, the
defendant, a pornography dealer, was convicted of willfully failing to maintain records. He
argued that the prosecution failed to show he was aware of the filing requirements. The
Sixth Circuit properly held that Cheek had not altered the rule that willfulness may be
proven through inferences from the actor's conduct. Sturman, 951 F2d at 1466.
88. James, 366 US at 241.
89. Id. at 245.
90. Id at 246.
91. For a discussion 6f Critzer, see notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
92. See for example United States v Diamond, 788 F2d 1025 (4th Cir 1986)(Critzer
defense rejected; broker-dealer taxation rules are not highly debatable.)
93. 935 F2d 1440 (4th Cir 1991).
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The Fourth Circuit held that the law relating to the taxation of
these arrangements, primarily the assignment of income doctrine,
was not "highly debatable."'"
In United States v Dahlstrom,95 however, a case involving eva-
sion through foreign tax shelters and trusts, the Ninth Circuit.
held, as in Critzer, that the legality "was completely unsettled by
any clearly relevant precedent."9 A blunt dissent argued that the
law was sufficiently clear that these purportedly complex tax struc-
tures were no more than sham trusts to allow prosecution.9 7 As
long as knowledge of illegality was proven, as it could be from the
facts of the scheme, conviction was appropriate.98
Finally in United States v Baer,99 the District Court denied a
motion to dismiss the indictment of an executor for failing to in-
clude property transferred to him by the decedent, his mother, on
the Federal Estate Tax Return. The executor offered that confu-
sion in the language on the effective dates of the modifications to
the transfers within three years rule of IRC section 2035 '00 (a with-
ering mouthful there) precluded his prosecution as a matter of
law.'01 In rejecting this idea, the court wisely noted, "[a]ttorneys
make arguments ranging from the astute to the absurd; the mere
fact that arguments have been made is no basis for finding a stat-
ute uncertain as a matter of law."'02 .
If the law itself is an issue, how is it to be debated in a criminal
prosecution? Note, at this point, that the issue will be debated in
these post-Cheek days in virtually every case in which the defend-
ant is willing to testify.' s While the reasonableness of the belief of
the defendant is not a prerequisite to the discussion of the delu-
sion, certainly the craziness of the idea is pertinent to whether the
defendant actually believes what he says. Prior to Cheek, courts
94. Schmidt, 935 F2d at 1448.
95: 713 F2d 1423 (9th Cir 1983), cert denied in 466 US 980 (1984).
96. Dahlstrom, 713 F2d at 1428.
97. Id at 1430.
98. Id at 1431-32.
99. 662 F Supp 126 (W D NY 1987).
100. 26 IRC § 2035 (1986).
101. Baer, 662 F Supp at 127.
102. Id at 130.
103. The position of the Justice Department is that a Cheek instruction is not appro-
priate unless the defendant testifies. See J. Andrew Hoerner, 54 Tax Notes 934 (February
24, 1992). That is, the only competent testimony to introduce the issue of a lack of knowl-
edge of the law is the defendant's. But the knowledge of illegality is more properly an ele-
ment of the offense which must be proven. This matter seems untested. Nonetheless, each
defendant who testifies can certainly say that he did not know that what he did was illegal.
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refused evidence proffered by the defense in the nature of expert
testimony as to either what the law actually is or what it is pur-
ported to be by the deluded. This exclusion of testimony about the
state of the law was longstanding and consistent with the view that
the trial court itself is the jury's source of law.' Now, post-Cheek,
there has been dithering about how we may examine the taxpayer's
purported misunderstanding.
In United States v Powell,10 5 for example, the Ninth Circuit re-
viewed the conviction of Roy and Dixie Powell for willful failure to
file returns. Their study of the Code led them to the belief that
filing returns was voluntary and they volunteered not to.0 6 The
Ninth Circuit reversed their conviction on two grounds. First, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the trial court violated Cheek chic by
instructing the jury that: "if a person acts without reasonable
grounds for belief that his or her conduct is lawful, it is for you to
decide whether the defendants acted in good faith."'0 7 The Ninth
Circuit gushed that this overt reference to reasonableness implied
that the belief must be reasonable for acquittal. 08 This conclusion
is rather prissy as it is clear that the more illogical and wild the
purported belief, the more unbelievable it is that the defendant
actually believes it. The Supreme Court explicitly recognized this
possible analysis in Cheek. 09 Worse, the Ninth Circuit gave full
blown respect for the defendant's thought process, believing that
such a conclusion was impelled by Cheek, a decision treated as hot
news.
1
Soon thereafter, in United States v Hirschfeld,"' the Fourth
Circuit considered a virtually identical instruction. The defendant
objected and was also refused in his request that the jury be told
that a defendant could hold a erroneous belief in good faith even if
there were no reasonable grounds for the belief."' "Good faith" in
the context of these prosecutions refers to the need for the jury to
find for acquittal that the defendant actually believed his errone-
104. See United States v Poschwatta, 829 F2d 1477 (9th Cir 1987), cert denied in 484
US 1064 (1988).
105. 936 F2d 1056 (9th Cir 1991)(Powell 1) opinion superseded by United States v
Powell, 955 F2d 1206 (9th Cir 1992)(Powell II).
106. Powell I, 936 F2d at 1059.
107. Id.
108. Id at 1061-62.
109. Cheek, 111 S Ct at 611 (cited in note 4).
110. Powell I, 936 F2d at 1061.
111. 964 F2d 318 (4th Cir 1992).
112. Hirschfeld, 964 F2d at 322.
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ous interpretation of the law as distinguished from garden variety
lying or a self-imposed delusion created for trial.1 3 In an action in
which the defendant claims that wages are not income, there are
no reasonable grounds for the belief. The defendant would not
want any tie between the rationality of the belief and whether he
believed. The Fourth Circuit held that the trial court did not err in
pointing out this logic and approved the instruction with some lim-
itations. The Fourth Circuit distinguished Powell I, holding that
the trial court had given a more elaborate and complete discussion
of the good faith principle than that in Powell ."4 Consequently,
the isolated focus in the instruction on reasonableness of the belief
was not prejudicial.11 5
Cheek chic is a confusion of fashion produced by the unfounded
notion that Cheek actually represents a change in tax crime princi-
ples. In an unpublished opinion, United States v Kimball,"' the
Ninth Circuit considered the same instruction, identical to Powell
I and Hirschfeld This time, however, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that viewing the instructions as a whole, there was no prejudice.'
But, thinking out loud again, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its skep-
ticism about the instruction." 8 In Powell II," the Circuit's modi-
fied opinion still reversed Powell's conviction based on the instruc-
tion. 20 "The vice of the jury instruction given is that it did not
make clear that a defendant must demonstrate only a subjective
good faith belief is held and not that the belief must also be found
to be objectively reasonable." 11
Under Cheek, juries are permitted to consider the outrageous-
ness of the defendant's purported belief in determining whether he
actually believes it.'22 Cheek does not require that juries be left to
113. Compare United States v Dockray, 943 F2d 152 (1st Cir 1991). Convicted of mail
and wire fraud, Dockray complained that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that
"good faith" is a defense. Reviewing a split in the circuits on this issue, the court held that
an adequate instruction that intent to defraud is a element of the crime would suffice to
convey the notion of "good faith." Dockray, 943 F2d at 155. At the oral argument, the de- -
fendant asked about Cheek. Cheek was distinguished, thankfully, the court holding that the
"willfulness requirement in tax evasion serves a function unique in criminal law: it makes
ignorance of the law a defense." Id at 156 (citation omitted).
114. Hirschfeld, 964 F2d at 323.
115. Id at 322-23.
116. 1991 US APP LEXIS 16094 (July 16, 1991 9th Cir) (unpublished opinion).
117. Kimball, US APP LEXIS 16094 at 10-11.
118. Id.
119. 955 F2d 1206 (9th Cir 1992).
120. For a discussion of Powell II see notes 126-136 and accompanying text.
121. Powell 11, 955 F2d at 1212.
122. Cheek, 111 S Ct at 611-12.
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their own devices in figuring the connection. Proof of law on the
government's side in conventional cases results in a conventional
instruction about what the law is. Defendants, however, have long
recognized that to the extent that they can "prove" that their
wrong belief is reasonable, they are more likely to be acquitted.
With the law itself at issue, the issue becomes what evidence may
be presented to the jury as to the formation of the defendant's
belief and, in response, how outrageous that belief is.
Before the new Cheek rage, proof of the source of defendant's
beliefs and proof of the "right" law was under some control. Sev-
eral principles dealt with excluding evidence from either side about
the law. The trial judge is considered the source of law for the ju-
rors. Consequently, testimony about what the law is was properly
excluded.1' 3 Testimony about how the defendant formed his be-
liefs, including the law itself and the sources and so-called experts
on which he relied also had been typically excluded on grounds of
confusion and irrelevance. 24 Pre-Cheek chic, the evidentiary issue
was characterized,not as how the defendant reached these odd con-
clusions, but whether he actually held them. But the character of
the odd belief and how far afield it is from mainstream thought is
relevant to determining the ability of the taxpayer to hold such a
belief. However salutary these proof limitations were in the expedi-
tious prosecution of tax criminals, now with Cheek in vogue, the
old limits are being tested.
The California Powells wished to offer as evidence in their de-
fense IRC section 6020(b).25 which empowers the Secretary to pre-
pare a return if the taxpayer fails to make one.'26 This statute is
the one, the Powells said, that led them to the conclusion that re-
turn making must be voluntary.2 7 The trial court would not allow
the statute to be read to the jury. 1 8 The jury deliberated and
(much like Cheek's jury) then inquired of the judge: "'[c]an IRS
file a 1040 without persons signing?' ",129 The trial court then took
the bit and read IRC section 6020(b) to the jury and told them
correctly that the statute only empowers the IRS to file a return in
123. See United States v Powell, 936 F2d 1056, 1064 (9th Cir 1991) ("Powell I") for a
discussion of traditional approaches to proof of law in tax crimes.
124. See discussion in Yochum, Ignorance, 27 Duquesne L Rev at 230 (cited in note
1).
125. IRC § 6020(b) (1986).






the event the taxpayer does not fulfill his obligation.'30 The Ninth
Circuit recognized that the jury cannot be allowed to interpret sec-
tion 6020(b) as obviating the filing requirement of section 7203' 1
and acquit on that basis. 132 Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit held
that any such instruction on the real state of the law must be tied
to a "strong reminder" that the only issue is the defendants' good
faith belief in their interpretation.'33
The Powells also wished to introduce other statutes and cases, a
request that the trial court refused.33 The Ninth Circuit in Powell
II cautioned hat such evidence may be relevant and probative as
to the defendants' mental state, but may be excluded if unnecessa-
rily confusing. 135 This holding represents a substantial modifica-
tion of the Ninth Circuit's view in Powell I,136 gushed out in the
first full flush of Cheek chic. In Powell I, the Ninth Circuit had
held that Cheek had impliedly overruled all cases which had per-
mitted the trial court to control proof of law in tax cases such that
the refusal to allow section 6020(b) into evidence was itself revers-
ible error. This over-expansion of Cheek which could lead to a tax-
protestor free for all with respect to a parade of oddities before
innocent juries had had only a six months life in the Ninth Circuit
but will surely spring to life elsewhere.
In United States v Lankford,37 the Eleventh Circuit considered
the availability of expert testimony on legal issues offered by both
sides after Sheriff Lankford was convicted of extortion and will-
fully filing false income tax returns. Part of the income tax convic-
tion was based on the failure to report a $1,500 item solicited from
an inmate at the Sheriff's county jail by a sergeant. The Sheriff
explained that he thought the money was a non-taxable gift be-
cause it was given to him ultimately by his re-election campaign
workers with an explanation that the check was to provide for his
family during the financial hardship of the coming campaign. 138
130. Id at 1209-10.
131. IRC § 7203 (1986).
132. Powell 11, 955 F2d at 1213. (It might be noted that in this needlessly confused
area of law popularized by Cheek, deciding that the defendant taxpayer may be legally cor-




135. Id at 1214.
136. 936 F2d at 1056. For a discussion of Powell I, see notes 106 -110 and accompany-
ing text.
137. 955 F2d 1545 (11th Cir 1992).
138. Lankford, 955 F2d at 1551. No claim of quasi-vagueness was made a Ia Harris
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The trial court refused a defense request to allow expert testimony
as to the reasonableness of Lankford's belief.139 The government,
however, was permitted to examine Lankford's tax-preparer as an
expert as to the proper accounting for campaign contributions
which are used for personal expenses.14° (Such items are not gifts
but income.) The Eleventh Circuit held that the exclusion of the
proffered defense expert was an abuse of discretion by the trial
court. 4"
Clearly, as the Eleventh Circuit notes, expert testimony as to the
reasonableness of the taxpayer's belief is relevant to determining
willfulness, and disallowing such testimony inhibits the ability of a
defendant to show that his belief was reasonable and thus more
likely held in good faith. The taxpayer must be allowed to show
through expert testimony that which a jury cannot figure out on its
own; that it would have been reasonable to treat the receipt as a
gift, not income. 4 2 It should be noted that as a additional ground
for reversal, the Eleventh Circuit held that allowing the United
States to use expert testimony to prove the craziness of the belief
requires, in fairness, an allowance for the defense to use experts in
rebuttal.143 With a nod to ancient practice, the Eleventh Circuit-
authorized the trial court to exclude testimony about the law it-
self. 4 For example, Lankford's expert was to testify about the dis-
tinction between gifts and taxable income under the Code. The
Eleventh Circuit held that "because it is for the judge to explain
the law to the jury," the testimony was properly refused.
1 45
The facility for juries to be confused will ease the defendant's
chore in creating reasonable doubt. The honest juror knows wages
are income but an untutored first-time view of the Code, presented
in a perverse fashion, can raise doubts about meaning even to the
second-year law student. In United States v Lussier,141 the First
Circuit held that the trial court properly excluded the tax evasion
defendant's proffered exhibits of a superseded 1946 treasury regu-
lation, the whole Code, and the Constitution. But, the First Circuit
noted that the exclusion was only proper because the evidence
even though this case also presents the issue what is a gift.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id at 1552.
142. Id at 1551-52.
143. Id at 1552.
144. Id at 1551.
145. Id at 1551 n 16.
146. 929 F2d 25, 31 (1st Cir 1991).
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lacked proper foundation, 17 a tactical error which will be avoided
by the next malevolently clever ignorant tax evader. 48 In permit-
ting or limiting expert or lay testimony with respect to the source
of the defendant's confusion, trial courts will find slight guidance
from Cheek. 4 As long as the decision remains popular, considera-
tion of proffers by defendants of protestor palaver will predict ably
increase. A criminal case reduced to a battle between putative legal
experts presents a good bet for the defendant.
In mid-polemic, the author reiterates that the problem with the
Cheek rule, even narrowly drawn, is that it discourages sensible
attention to well understood obligations. Because there exists such
a vast array of sources of information upon which a taxpayer might
rely, the truly criminal can avoid knowledge of the real law as a
dodge to protect against incarceration. Consequently, the fabric of
willful ignorance or blindness instruction, as Cheek increases in
chic, may be subject to alteration. The Jewell instruction"5 ' has
been useful to infer knowledge of illegality in criminal tax prosecu-
tions.' Nothing in Cheek should alter its use but, of course, that
will not preclude defendants from arguing that actual knowledge of
illegality must be directly proven. 5
147. Lussier, 929 F2d at 31.
148. See also United States v Regan, 937 F2d 823 (2d Cir 1991). The Second Circuit
reversed Regan's evasion conviction arising out of a stock parking scam. The trial court held
that the defendant's analysis of section 1058, the basis for the dodge, was too "sophistical"
and contrary to law for the jury to consider. Regan, 937 F2d at 826. The Second Circuit
properly held that this was error under Cheek. The issue of the rejection of experts' testi-
mony was not reached.
149. Note.that the Federal Rules of Evidence, applicable in tax crime prosecutions,
provide little basis for the exclusion of such testimony. FRE 701 does allow a lay person to
offer an opinion as to a defendant's state of mind if the lay person's opinion is based on the
witness's perception and if it is helpful. Consequently, if the foundation is made, opinion
testimony that the defendant knew he was evading tax is admissible. See United States v
Rea, 958 F2d 1206 (2d Cir 1992). Experts on either side are limited, however, by FRE 704(b)
which precludes expert testimony with respect to whether a criminal defendant did or did
not have the mental state required by the crime. This limitation, created to remove ultimate
issue testimony in insanity cases, does not restrict expert testimony as to the basis for belief
or confusion in the law itself. For example, psychiatric testimony that the defendant be-
lieved his delusion is excluded. United States v Felak, 831 F2d 794 (8th Cir 1987).
150. United States v Jewell, 532 F2d 697 (9th Cir 1976) (en banc), cert denied 426 US
951 (1976).
151. See United States v Bussey, 942 F2d 1241, 1246 (8th Cir 1991): "A finding be-
yond reasonable doubt of a conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment would permit an in-
ference of knowledge." Bussey, 942 F2d at 1246.
152. Id at 1249. (Cheek held to be inapposite to a challenge to a willful blindness
instruction.) Compare, however, Mattingly v United States, 924 F2d 785 (8th Cir 1991). In
Mattingly, a proceeding to impose the penalty under section 6701 for one who aids in the
preparation of return which the actor "knows" will understate liability, the Eighth Circuit
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The Second Circuit reviewed the instruction, post-Cheek, in
Unites States v Fletcher,15 a case involving, convictions for con-
spiracy to defraud the government. The defendants were involved
in a complex scheme to mask profits on certain firearm sales.5 4
The Fletchers conceded that they knew that the purpose of the
arrangements they had made was to minimize tax, but they denied
knowing that the means of the conspiracy was illegal.15 The trial
court instructed the jury that, in Cheek style, if the defendants
"actually believed" the conspiracy would not be used to defraud
the Service, they must be acquitted. 56 The trial court, however,
also instructed that the defendant may be found guilty if he acted
with deliberate disregard of a high probability that the conspiracy
had an unlawful objective.157 The Second Circuit approved the lat-
ter instruction, noting an ample factual predicate: use of aliases,
failure to file tax returns, and the sneaky movement of guns and
funds.'58
Similarly, in United States v Fingado,'59 the Tenth Circuit has
continued to approve the use of the instruction in a willful failure
to file prosecution. As a devoted student of The Big Bluff, Tax
Tyranny in the Guise of the Law, The Constitution v The Tax
Collector by the criminal authority Art Marvin Cooley, Mr. Fin-
gado failed to file a tax return. 60 Again, a factual predicate was
found for the instruction. 61 The court noted: 1) that the defendant
was, with high probability, aware that his understanding was erro-
neous; 2) that he never consulted a professional; 3) that he at-
tended tax protest seminars; and 4) that he knew his interpreta-
held that a willful blindness instruction cannot be used as a substitute for knowledge. Mat-
tingly, 924 F2d at 791-92. See also William C. Raby, Section 6701 Aiding-and-Abetting
Cases: What Does the Service Have to Prove?, Tax Notes 367 (April 20, 1992).
153. 928 F2d 495 (2d Cir 1991).
154. Fletcher, 928 F2d at 497.
155. Id at 502.
156. Id.
157. Id at 501.
158. Id at 503.
159. 934 F2d 1163 (10th Cir 1991).
160. Fingado, 934 F2d atl164. The Tenth Circuit reviewed also Fingado's claim that
he should have been permitted to present the jury with all of his tax protestor seminar
material. The tome referred to in the text was submitted into evidence but was taped shut.
so that the jury could not look into it. Presumably, the trial court felt that the existence of
the book was of sufficient benefit to the defendant in displaying to the jury that there was at
least tangible evidence of his delusion. Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit concluded that exclu-
sion was proper and that Cheek does not require the admission of everything. Id at 1165 n 1.
161. Id at 1166-67. Happily, the facts which form that foundation are almost universal
in the protest movement cases.
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tion differed from the bulk of citizens and the Service. 62 The
willful ignorance instruction is another way of calling to the jury's
attention the notion that the more outrageous the belief, the less
likely that it is really held in good faith. 163 None of these ap-
proaches should be affected by Cheek.
Cheek chic also must not infect other areas of tax crimes and
penalties. Recent revisions in the penalties of a non-criminal na-
ture are untested and ripe for assault. Chapter 68 of the Code'6 4
contains additions to the tax and assessable penalties. The first
category relates primarily to failures of the principal taxpayer; the
latter with reporting and other third party information require-
ments. This chapter is a mix of statutes new and old and is pep-
pered with the evil word willfully.
For example, section 6651 imposes an addition to tax for failure
to file or pay unless the failure was "due to reasonable cause and
not due to willful neglect."'' 6 5 The coupling of willful with neglect
seems almost oxymoronic in that it implies a purposeful forgetful-
ness. Another set of these civil penalties is imposed if the violation
is "willfully"' done. The model, and most highly employed, statute
of this category is section 6672166 which imposes a 100% penalty
for "willfully" failing to collect and pay. This penalty is chiefly ex-
acted from those who fail to withhold, or fail to pay over, that
which has been withheld.1
6 7
Pre-Cheek, the penalty provisions had been interpreted differ-
ently from the criminal statutes that use the troublesome word. In
Revenue Ruling 54-158,161 the Service attempted to explain this
162. Id.
163. The use of the instruction is not without limitation, but those limits are a prod-
uct of ordinary criminal law and do not arise because the prosecution is for tax crimes. See
United States v de Francisco-Lopez, 939 F2d 1405 (10th Cir 1991).
164. IRC Ch 68, "Additions to the Tax, Additional Amounts, and Assessable Penal-
ties," §§ 6651 - 6708 (1986).
165. IRC § 6651 (1986). The Code is replete. with sections which provide the same
affirmative defense to penalty. See IRC §§ 6652 (Failure to file certain information returns);
6656 (Failure to make deposit of taxes); 6695 (Certain penalties against preparers); 6704
(Pension record violations); 6706 (Original issue discount rules); 6708 (Failure to maintain
shelter information); 6709 (Mortgage credit reporting violations).
166. IRC § 6672 (1986).
167. Other statutes also follow this formula. See IRC §§ 6674 (Furnishing a false state-
ment); 6690 (False pension information); 6684 (Taxes under Chapter 8); 6685 (Tax exempt
organization records). In addition, section 6694(b) imposes a greater penalty on income tax
preparers when the understatement of liability was because of a "willful attempt." IRC Reg.
1.6694-1(b)(2) defines, however, this willful as "disregard of information furnished by the
taxpayer or others."
168. Rev Rul 54-158, 1954 Cum Bull 247.
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linguistic trick. Simply, the ruling concluded that where evil mo-
tive is a constituent element of the tax felonies, the imposition of
penalties containing the word willfully does not require knowledge
of illegality.169 Few cases have arisen testing the penalty provisions
except with respect to that most common form of evasion, the
cheating employer committing a withholding violation. There, the
word willfully has produced a split in the circuits. Cheek involve-
ment would only worsen the fray.
In Olsen v United States,7 ' the taxpayer sought reversal of the
imposition of the 100% penalty because he had made a deal with
an IRS agent concerning the way in which his withholding obliga-
tions would be satisfied. He knew that the funds, in fact, were not
being paid to the IRS but were being used to pay company credi-
tors, and he knew the consequences of his failure to pay.17 1 The
circuits, however, are split as to whether "reasonable cause" for the
failure vitiates the willfulness element of the penalty statute.1
7
1
The Eighth Circuit in Olsen rejected this defense, holding that the
willfulness requirement of the penalty provision is satisfied if,
knowingly or with reckless disregard of risk, the taxpayer acts in a
fashion which causes the government not to be paid.
1 73
This interpretation of willfully is properly afield from the Cheek
gloss on the word in the criminal statutes. The Seventh Circuit, in
following this approach in Monday v United States,174 explained
that although denominated as a penalty, this exaction was civil in
nature and designed to make the government whole. The consider-
ation of cause factors such as financial conditions, creditor de-
mands or bad advice were inappropriate.175
The Fifth Circuit has recognized the defense of "reasonable
cause" but with little success on the part of the taxpayer. In New-
some v United States,'76 the Fifth Circuit reversed a trial court's
order which had found the imposition of the penalty improper.
The district court had held that non-negligent reliance on e-rrone-
ous advice from corporate accountants and lawyers vitiated the
169. 1954 Cum Bull at 249.
170. 92-1 USTC V 50,036, 83,144 (8th Cir 1991).
171. Olsen, 92-1 USTC at 83,146.
172. Id at 83,147. See also Harrington v United States, 74-2 USTC 19772, 85,538 (1st
Cir 1974).
173. Olsen, 92-1 USTC at 83,146.
174. 70-1 USTC 9205, 82,828 (7th Cir 1970).
175. Monday, 70-1 USTC at 82,831.
176. 70-2 USTC 1 9504, 84,147 (5th Cir 1970).
Vol. 31:249
Cheek is Chic
taxpayer's willfulness. 177 The Fifth Circuit; while recognizing the
existence of a defense, held that this taxpayer did not qualify be-
cause none of the advice he received told him that he was permit-
ted not to pay the withholding without subjecting himself to
penalties.
178
Is Cheek fashion broad enough to intrude into this discussion?
Clearly, the popular implication of the decision is that knowledge
of illegality is a component of the word willfully, and that to some
extent, perhaps under a trickle down theory of levels of culpability,
other penalty statutes might be newly considered to provide at
least a reasonable cause defense. For example, in Williams v
United States,'7 9 the Eleventh Circuit, in reversing a judgment en-
tered after a jury verdict for refund of the 100% penalty, noted
that the simple inability to pay was ineffective to vitiate willful-
ness. Yet the court, spellbound by Cheek, cited the case for the
proposition that willful means the "voluntary, intentional violation
of a known legal duty."18 0 The criminal decision of Cheek is out of
place here and can only encourage those seeking to restrict the
reach of civil penalties.1 81
The civil penalty statutes which provide an affirmative defense
specifically for "reasonable cause and not willful neglect" have yet
to display a rash from Cheek. In these cases, the taxpayer must
show not only the lack of neglect but also affirmative reasonable
cause. 8 2 As noted in the First Circuit's Harrington v United
States,'8 3 an action reviewing the imposition of a section 6672 pen-
alty, the presence of the reasonable cause defense in other penalty
statutes implies that, had Congress intended the defense every-
where willfully occurs, the legislature could have said so.
The common sense of the First Circuit's notion that Congress
could specify offenses has been brought to fruition in the new ac-
curacy-related penalty provisions of the Code. While the purpose
of this piece is not to explore the voluminous mass of new and
frightening provisions, some legal experiments are being conducted
177. Newsome, 70-2 USTC at 84,150.
178. Id at 84,151.
179. 931 F2d 805 (11th Cir 1991).
180. Williams, 931 F2d at 810.
181. But see Jenny v United States, 581 F Supp 1309 (CD Cal 1984)(The frivolous
return penalty of section 6702 was held to be penal in nature and was to be strictly
construed).
182. Coshocton Securities Co., 26 Tax Ct 935 (1956)(Taxpayer must seek advice to
establish reasonable cause).
183. 74-2 USTC $9772, 85,538 (1st Cir 1974).
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with these, statutes which may provide a future clue to a statutory
structure for limiting the ignorance of the law defense in criminal
prosecutions. Section 6662184 imposes accuracy-related penalties
for various levels of infractions based both on the dollar amount of
the infraction and the mental state of the actor. A penalty is im-
posed for negligence or disregard of rules which includes, under
section 6662(c), failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply
and careless or reckless disregard.' 85 The regulations provide that a
taxpayer fails to make a reasonable attempt to ascertain the rea-
sonableness, of a deduction when the item would seem to a reason-
able and prudent person too good to be true. 86 A penalty will be
imposed for a substantial. understatement under section 6662(d)
unless there was a disclosure of the aberrant treatment on the re-
turn, or the position was supported by substantial authority.'87
Under section 6662(d)(2)(D)(i),' 88 the Secretary must create a list
of those positions for which he believes there is not such authority.
Justice would be served if, for example, the published list of frivo-
lous positions might be withdrawn from consideration in a tax-
payer's criminal prosecution as well.
There is hope that Cheek will eventually recede and those who
take positions that are too good to be true will be incarcerated, in
spite of their hollow claims of confusion and delusion. Cheek him-
self was retried and a properly Cheek-instructed jury found him
completely guilty. 89 Judge Zagel gave him a year and a day and
with good sense called Cheek, "fundamentally lawless."' 90
While the desire of most authors is to create a timeless work,
this author hopes that this brief sketch of late twentieth century
fashionable issues of criminal tax law will soon be relegated to a
dusty corner, for archivists only. Like the leisure suit, Cheek
should be hung in a rarely opened closet, only rarely to be ex-
humed and then only so that we might marvel at what we once
thought appropriate for public wear. Cheek only brought the Sev-
enth Circuit into line with the other circuits, which have always
held that ignorance of the law is a sorry excuse for tax crimes.
184. IRC § 6662 (1986).
185. IRC § 6662(c) (1986).
186. Treas Reg § 1.6662-3(b)(ii) (1986).
187. See IRC § 6662(d)(2)(B)(i) (1986). -
188. IRC § 6662(d)(2)(D)(i) (1986).
189. R. Zeider, "Cheek Convicted of Tax Evasion," Tax Notes 1597 (March 30, 1992).
190. Zeider, Tax Notes 1597.
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